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Taiwan’s “Macedonian Project,” 1999–2001
Czeslaw Tubilewicz
ABSTRACT Since 1989, Taipei has attempted to capitalize on the systemic changes
in East Central Europe. It achieved its goal of winning diplomatic allies among the
post-communist states only in 1999, when Macedonia recognized the Republic of
China (ROC) hoping that Taipei’s generosity would resolve its economic problems.
In order to showcase the effectiveness of its assistance, Taipei resorted to economic
diplomacy and offered Skopje loans, humanitarian and technical assistance. Yet, the
Macedonian–Taiwanese partnership ended in 2001. This report will argue that Taipei
failed to become a viable alternative to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as
Skopje’s economic and diplomatic partner because of China’s clout in international
affairs and its own reluctance to shower Macedonia with developmental assistance.
Instead of showcasing Taiwan’s ability to maintain a diplomatic ally through a
pro-active economic foreign policy, the failed Macedonian project underlined the
limited effectiveness of the ROC’s economic diplomacy and the perennial problem of
the ROC diplomacy: a successful international isolation by the PRC.
Ever since its exclusion from the United Nations (UN) in 1971, the
Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) toyed with an idea of political
rapprochement with the states of East Central Europe. However, due to
the anti-communist convictions of Chiang Kai-shek and his successor,
Chiang Ching-kuo, Taipei failed to pursue its own version of Ostpolitik.
Only the emergence of the native-born leader Lee Teng-hui in the late
1980s freed the ROC foreign policy of anti-communist dogmas, allowing
it to pursue relations with the Soviet bloc. Taipei opened direct trade with
East Central Europe in 1988 and the Soviet Union in 1990. Low-key
political communication soon followed.
For years, Taiwan’s insignificant investments in East Central Europe
were explained in terms of East Central Europeans’ reluctance to pursue
diplomatic rather than “substantive” relations with the ROC. Latvia’s
consular ties with Taiwan in the early 1990s demonstrated that even
“near-diplomatic” relations were insufficient to generate Taiwanese inter-
est in the post-communist economies.1 Obviously, the Taiwanese busi-
ness people did not find the emerging markets in East Central Europe
promising enough, while the ROC government hinted that nothing short
of diplomatic relations would stimulate its generosity. Macedonia became
the first post-communist state brave enough to test the uncharted waters
of the ROC aid diplomacy in East Central Europe while the Macedonian
project became a litmus test of the long-term effectiveness of Taiwan’s
1. Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “The Baltic States in Taiwan’s post-Cold War ‘flexible
diplomacy’,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 5 (2002), pp. 796-801.
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economic diplomacy in maintaining and expanding Taipei’s diplomatic
space in East Central Europe, if not beyond.2
The purpose of this research report is to scrutinize the Taiwanese
diplomatic strategy towards Macedonia and, by doing so, to analyse the
effectiveness of Taipei’s contemporary economic diplomacy. More
specifically, the report will discuss the sources of Taiwanese success in
Macedonia, the foundations of Taiwanese–Macedonian partnership,
China’s responses, and – finally – reasons behind the suspension of
official ties between Taipei and Skopje in June 2001. It will argue that
despite a consistent pursuit of diplomatic allies in the post-communist
region, Taipei proved incapable of becoming a viable alternative to the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as Skopje’s economic and diplomatic
partner. This is because of the PRC’s clout in international affairs and
Taiwanese reluctance to perform economic miracles in Macedonia. Anx-
ious about the domestic repercussions of massive economic assistance for
its little-known ally and the uncertainty of the long-term prospects of
Macedonia’s loyalty, Taipei opted for a cautious approach, granting more
loans than grants, failing to generate fast investments, and ultimately
falling short of fulfilling the inflated expectations of the Macedonian
public. At the same time, China’s unco-operative approach at the UN on
the issues of security in Macedonia accentuated the political cost of the
diplomatic partnership with Taiwan. Thus, instead of becoming the
showcase of Taiwan’s ability to maintain a diplomatic ally through a
pro-active economic foreign policy, the failure of the Macedonian project
underscored the limited effectiveness of the ROC’s cautious economic
diplomacy and the perennial problem of ROC diplomacy: successful
international isolation by the PRC.
Recognition
Beijing recognized Macedonia on 12 October 1993 under its consti-
tutional name “Macedonia,” rather than the name under which Macedonia
was forced by Greece to join the UN: the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. Unlike Beijing’s ties with Ljubljana and Zagreb, however,
Sino-Macedonian relations were not particularly active.3 Nevertheless
Skopje did not complain. On the contrary, the Macedonian ruling party,
the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia Party (Socijaldemokratski
Sojuz na Makedonija, SDSM), and President Kiro Gligorov (the former
leader of the SDSM) were pleased to note China’s interest in the
Macedonian affairs and its support on the UN forum for peace in the
Balkans. When Gligorov made his first visit to the PRC in June 1997, he
called the Sino-Macedonian relationship “a model of bilateral relations
2. Economic diplomacy is defined here as influence attempt relying primarily on
resources, which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money. Aid
diplomacy is a sub-category of economic diplomacy. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 13–14.
3. Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “China and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1990–1994: Beijing’s exercise
in dialectics,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 100–102.
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Table 1: The PRC’s Trade with Macedonia (millions of US dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Export X 1 1 1 2 2 4
Import X X X X X X X
Note:
X – data unknown.
Source:
Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2000 (Washington: International Monetary Fund,
2000), p.164.
for the World” and described China as “one of the best friends of
Macedonia.”4 Beijing supported the establishment (March 1995) and the
subsequent extensions of the mandate of the UN Preventive Deployment
Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia, signed a number of economic and
cultural agreements with Skopje, and donated humanitarian aid to Mace-
donia.5 In return, the Macedonians pledged “not to initiate official rela-
tions, nor to maintain official relations with Taiwan.”6 Bilateral trade
lagged behind the political interaction. Macedonia’s exports to China
amounted to nil, while China’s exports to Macedonia did not reach US$4
million until 1999 (see Table 1). Unlike the Poles or Czechs, the
Macedonians chose to blame the economic sanctions against Yugoslavia
and the war-disrupted communication routes for the low trade figures
rather than Chinese reluctance to pursue more active economic co-oper-
ation. Negligible trade notwithstanding, China did offer Skopje in the late
1990s a US$83 million loan to construct a hydroelectric power plant.
The reluctance to pursue communication with Taiwan, characteristic of
the Social Democratic government, did not apply to Macedonia’s oppo-
sition parties. In August 1997, Vasil Tupurkovski, then a private citizen,
met Taiwan’s representative to the Netherlands, Ku Chung-lien. The
meeting proved successful enough as Tupurkovski soon travelled to the
ROC, where he met President Lee. Thereafter, the ROC representative
office in Austria liaised with the Macedonian opposition. Having become
the chairman of the newly formed political party the Democratic Alterna-
tives (Demokratska Alternativa, DA) in early 1988, Tupurkovski ar-
ranged the DA’s visit to Taiwan in March 1998. President Lee met him
again to discuss Taiwanese–Macedonian relations. Negotiations between
the Macedonian opposition and the Taiwanese envoys followed. In true
4. Xinhua, 8 June 1997, in Foreign Broadcasts Information Service, China Report
(hereafter FBIS-CHI), No. 159 (1997); Xinhua, 10 June 1997, in FBIS-CHI, No. 161 (1997).
5. In mid-1995, the Chinese Red Cross Society donated to Macedonia US$50,000. In
February 1997, Beijing provided Skopje with a humanitarian assistance package worth
US$130,000. The assistance was intended to help alleviate Macedonia’s economic losses,
which resulted from the international economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and the burden
of accepting Bosnian refugees.
6. Macedonian News Agency (MIC), 10 June 1997, in FBIS, East Europe Report
(FBIS-EEU), No. 162 (1997).
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Bondesque style, these talks were conducted in secret locations in Mace-
donia, as well as at bars and restaurants in Amsterdam, Vienna and The
Hague. They centred on the issue of Taiwanese economic assistance to
the Macedonian economy in exchange for diplomatic relations in the
aftermath of the hypothetical electoral victory of the opposition. Little is
known of the exact promises made by the Taiwanese diplomats. They
must have been, however, sufficiently sincere for the opposition leaders
to consider them seriously. This was particularly true in the case of the
DA, which campaigned in parliamentary elections in late 1998 pledging
to attract US$1 billion in foreign investments to Macedonia. As it later
turned out, much of the envisaged investment was to come from Greece
and Taiwan.
During the parliamentary elections in November 1998, the Macedonian
voters – angry with East Central Europe’s slowest growth rate (3 per
cent) and Europe’s highest unemployment (40 per cent) – voted for a
change and gave opposition parties a parliamentarian majority. In the
centre-right coalition government, led by the Internal Macedonian Revol-
utionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
(Vnatresna Makedonska Revoluciona Organizacija–Demokratska Partija
za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo, VMRO-DPMNE) and its leader
Ljubco Georgievski as the prime minister, the DA’s chairman Vasil
Tupurkovski became vice-premier, while his party colleague Aleksandar
Dimitrov took over foreign affairs. Shortly after the parliamentarian
victory, Tupurkovski again visited Taiwan. In late January 1999, ROC
deputy foreign minister David Lee Ta-wei met new Macedonian leader-
ship in Skopje, where he finalized – in great secrecy – an agreement on
mutual diplomatic recognition. On 27 January, Dimitrov (in
Tupurkovski’s company) signed in Taipei an agreement with his ROC
counterpart Hu Chih-chiang, opening diplomatic ties between Macedonia
and the ROC. Macedonia became Taiwan’s 28th diplomatic partner and
second ally in Europe, 24 years after Taipei lost Portugal as one of its
only two diplomatic footholds in Europe. Taipei reportedly rewarded the
broker of the deal, Tupurkovski, generously.7
The unexpected establishment of Taiwanese–Macedonian ties caught
President Gligorov – a self-proclaimed friend of the PRC – off guard.
Adding to the confusion surrounding the Dimitrov–Hu communique´,
Gligorov reaffirmed Macedonia’s continued recognition of Beijing and of
Taiwan as an integral part of the PRC. In a televised address to the nation
on 29 January 1999, the President called on the Macedonians to oppose
the government’s decision on Taiwan and urged the government to
revoke it.8 The Social Democrats and Liberals backed the President. The
Macedonian dailies Dnevnik and Makedonija Denes echoed the Presi-
dent’s outrage by calling the establishment of diplomatic relations with
7. His commission must have been sufficiently large, as he later claimed to use it for
construction of the philharmonic hall and sports hall. Tupurkovski never reported the sum he
received from Taiwan to the tax authorities.
8. Radio Macedonia, 29 January 1999, in BBC Monitoring Service: European-Political,
30 January 1999.
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the ROC a “hazardous decision” and a “scandalous move,” and request-
ing a “thorough explanation” from Dimitrov and Tupurkovski.9
China’s Counter-offensive
Both Macedonia and Taiwan made concerted efforts to pre-empt
China’s fury. Dimitrov revealed that his country “would like to maintain
ties with both Beijing and Taipei,” while Hu emphasized that forging
official ties with Macedonia was not aimed at a third party.10 The PRC
foreign ministry spokesman, Zhang Qiyue, urged Skopje to “proceed from
the fundamental interests of its people” and “make a ‘wise decision’ not
to recognize the validity of the communique´.”11 On 31 January, the PRC
ambassador to Skopje, Xu Yuehe, issued a final warning stating China’s
determination to sever diplomatic relations and reconsider support for the
extension of the UNPREDEP’s mandate, had Macedonia not immediately
reversed its decision. Beijing also advised Skopje to abandon illusions of
sustaining parallel relations with both parts of the divided China.
Undisturbed by these warnings, on 8 February 1999, the Macedonian
government officially confirmed the establishment of diplomatic ties with
the ROC, ending two weeks of confusion.12 A day after the clarification,
China suspended diplomatic relations with Macedonia, citing the viol-
ation of the Joint Communique´ on the Establishment of Diplomatic Ties
Between China and Macedonia and Macedonia’s stated commitment to
consider Taiwan an inalienable part of China. Beijing halted the im-
plementation of all agreements between the two governments and re-
called its ambassador, while Macedonia settled all outstanding payments
to China.13
Macedonian leadership played down the prospects of China’s possible
UN veto, hoping that China as a major power would not block the
extension of the UN peacekeeping forces’ mandate (due to expire on 28
February 1999) in a retaliatory move against the Taiwan policy of a small
and impoverished Balkan state. Dimitrov stated that China’s responsi-
bility as a permanent member of the Security Council was to safeguard
peace in all parts of the world, including Macedonia, irrespective of
“certain bilateral problems.”14 The Western powers, however, did not
share Macedonian optimism. Amid domestic and international criticism
that Skopje would have been wiser to make its Taiwan move after the UN
voting, Macedonia’s information minister Rexhep Zlatku reposted that
9. Reuters, 28 January 1999.
10. Reuters, 27 January 1999; Central News Agency, 27 January 1999, in BBC Monitoring
Service: Asia-Pacific, 27 January 1999, see also Zhongyang ribao, 10 February 1999.
11. Xinhua, 28 January 1999.
12. On the same day, the ROC MOFA officials formally hoisted the ROC flag in Skopje.
Lianhe bao, 10 February 1999. On 12 February, Macedonian parliament approved the
establishment of diplomatic ties with Taiwan by 65 votes against 7.
13. Interestingly, the construction of China-funded and constructed hydroelectric power
plant continued.
14. Radio Macedonia, 12 February 1999, in BBC Monitoring Service: European-Political,
13 February 1999.
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the government expected either the United States’ pressure over the UN
mission or China’s conscience to prevent Beijing from vetoing the
UNPREDEP’s mandate. Therefore, the coalition did not consider the
timing to be an issue.15
The timing, however, did play a role. Unable to rise above its particu-
laristic interests, the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared the task of the
UN peacekeeping force in Macedonia to be completed and saw no need
for an extension. On 25 February 1999, Beijing vetoed a Security Council
resolution to renew the UNPREDEP’s mandate until 31 August 1999.16
The Chinese veto disconcerted the international community, but calls on
Beijing to reconsider its decision in order to maintain stability in Macedo-
nia and abide by the obligations incumbent upon China under the UN
Charter proved fruitless. The 1,100 member peacekeeping force, which
successfully prevented the spread of fighting from Bosnia into Macedo-
nia, was sent home. Facing the escalating ethnic conflict in Kosovo, the
departure of the UNPREDEP put Macedonia in an extremely precarious
position. The coalition government, however, appeared undisturbed.
Shortly after the UN vote, the Macedonian ambassador to the UN, Naste
Calovski, announced that Beijing’s veto would not affect his country’s
relations with Taiwan, which he described as “strong and steadfast.”17
Premier Georgievski seemingly rejoiced at the prospects of having the
UN mission substituted by the troops of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), which brought Macedonia close to Euro-Atlantic
military structures.18
Aid Diplomacy
Responding to the domestic criticism of its U-turn on the “one China”
principle, the Macedonian government spoke frankly of the economic
motivations behind its Taiwan policy and publicized very substantial
economic assistance, allegedly pledged by Taipei in exchange for diplo-
matic recognition. Foreign minister Hu refused to comment on the media
report that Taipei promised Skopje US$1.6 billion (in aid, rather than
investments) for diplomatic recognition. This figure was substantially
larger than anything Taiwan ever donated to any of its existing diplomatic
partners (see Table 2). It was also substantially larger than the whole
budget of the ROC’s aid agency (around US$390 million in 1999), the
Overseas Economic Co-operation Development Fund, established in 1988
with the purpose of providing economic assistance to Taiwan’s allies and
15. China News, 9 February 1999; Reuters, 12 February 1999.
16. It was China’s fourth veto since 1971. The last veto was in January 1997 against 155
military observers who were to monitor peace accords in Guatemala, which had ties with
Taiwan. China reversed its position two weeks later, when Guatemala reportedly promised
to cease supporting the ROC’s annual attempts to join the UN. In the past, China twice
threatened to veto UN troops to Haiti for the same reason. The move forced the UNSC to
change the name of the Haiti mission and have the United States and Canada pay for the troops.
17. China News, 27 February 1999.
18. Radio Macedonia, 1 March 1999, in BBC Monitoring Service: European-Political, 2
March 1999.
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Table 2: Examples of Economic Rewards Extended by Taiwan to Its
New Diplomatic Allies
Rewarded state (year) Size of reward (US$)
Grenada (1989) 10 million
Liberia (1989) 20 million
Nicaragua (1990) 100 million
Guinea-Bissau (1991) 20 million
Central African Republic (1991) 300 million
Source:
Tuan Y. Cheng, “Foreign trade in ROC diplomacy,” in Bih-jaw Lin and James T. Myers,
Contemporary China and the Changing International Community (Columbia: University of
South Carolina, 1994), pp.176–77.
substantive partners. When Dimitrov mentioned US$1 billion, Taipei
insisted that such an amount was “very unlikely.”19 Yet, it is hardly likely
that Taiwan’s pre-recognition promises were limited to the pledge men-
tioned in the joint communique´, according to which Taiwan offered –
through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
– aid up to US$15 million for the development of small and medium
sized enterprises.20 Premier Georgievski must have been aware of larger
amounts of money when on 23 February 1999 he confirmed in the
televised address to the assembly that recognition of Taipei was triggered
by the disastrous economic situation of his country, rather than dissatis-
faction with Sino-Macedonian relations.21 The Macedonian leadership
expected the golden rain from Taiwan – revised to US$235 million in
government-to-government aid and US$1 billion in commercial invest-
ments – to fall in the second half of 1999.22 The ongoing assessment of
the correctness of the Taiwan policy was to be measured against the
economic performance of Taiwanese–Macedonian co-operation.
The astronomical figures for Macedonian friendship did not go down
well in Taiwan. The ROC legislators from the opposition New Party
(xindang) and even the ruling Kuomintang questioned the need to “spend
so much money pursuing diplomatic allies,” instead of, for example,
strengthening Taiwan’s economic competitiveness.23 Taiwanese business-
men, for their part, queried the benefits of economic co-operation with
Macedonia, which was distant and unfamiliar. However, the ROC’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) insisted that Taiwan’s involvement
in Macedonian economy would benefit both sides. In an interview with
the Macedonian daily Vecer, foreign minister Hu spoke confidently of
19. Zhongguo shibao, 1 February 1999; South China Morning Post, 30 January 1999.
20. Lianhe bao, 18 February 1999.
21. Macedonian TV1, 23 February 1999, in BBC Monitoring Service: Central Eu-
rope&Balkans, 26 February 1999.
22. China News, 4 March 1999.
23. China News, 28 January 1999.
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Macedonia being an “ideal place for an economic breakthrough of
Taiwan towards Europe.”24
It is unclear how much money Taipei planned to invest in this
“breakthrough” and over what period. Foreign minister Hu’s trip to
Macedonia in early March 1999 confirmed Taipei’s intention to provide
financial aid, but not on the scale expected by the Macedonians. The ROC
agreed to station a technical mission in Macedonia as well as to train
Macedonian technical personnel in Taiwan. Further, they allocated
US$10 million as a revolving credit to support private enterprises and
opened the Taiwanese market for Macedonian commodities.25 Moreover,
Taipei reportedly provided Skopje with US$10 million to bolster Mace-
donia’s foreign reserves and earmarked US$163 million for eight invest-
ments, set to provide 10,000 jobs. It was also expected to launch 800
projects ranging from moon cake and dessert making factories to chop-
stick factories.26 According to foreign minister Hu, Taiwanese aid was to
accelerate in the period leading to the presidential elections in Macedo-
nia, scheduled for late September, in order to bolster the election
prospects of Tupurkovski, the only pro-Taiwan candidate in the contest.
The sudden outbreak of the military conflict in Kosovo in late March
1999 delayed the arrival of the chopstick factories, but offered Taipei a
new opportunity to showcase generosity. Prompted by the urgent request
from Skopje, Taipei donated, as a “member of the international com-
munity,” US$2 million in humanitarian aid (soon increased to US$4
million) to help Macedonia settle Kosovo refugees.27 Vice-foreign minis-
ter Lee personally led a 91-member relief team (Maqidun jingnei nanmin
jiuyuantuan), which set up a field hospital at one of the refugee camps
and delivered medical equipment worth US$300,000. Taiwan’s 75-day
medical relief provided medical assistance to some 11,000 Kosovar
refugees.
Taiwan’s charity show continued when a technical pact, signed in May
1999, earmarked US$12 million to US$20 million for technical co-oper-
ation between the two countries. But the headline-stealing offer came
only during Georgievski’s visit to Taipei in early June 1999, when
President Lee promised US$300 million for the reconstruction of
Kosovo.28 Although the fund was – in name at least – intended for
Kosovo, in reality, much of it was to benefit Macedonia, as Taiwan would
pay for Kosovo’s imports from Macedonia. Alongside President Lee’s
grand plan, Georgievski left Taiwan with an aid package including a
US$12 million loan provided by the International Co-operation Develop-
ment Fund for Macedonian private businesses, a helicopter (donated by
the ROC National Defence Ministry), 500 computers and 200 scanners
worth US$5 million (donated by a private computer company) and 100
24. Reuters, 23 February 1999
25. Reuters, 5 March 1999.
26. Reuters, 16 March 1999.
27. According to Georgievski, the ROC was the only country making cash donations to
Macedonia since the NATO air strikes.
28. Zhongyang ribao, 8 June 1999.
790 The China Quarterly
wheelchairs. Taipei committed itself to buying US$1 million worth of
tobacco and wine from Macedonia, as well as agreeing to construct an
export processing zone in Macedonia, said to attract US$200 million
worth of Taiwanese investments and to create 20,000 jobs. To facilitate
Taiwanese investments, Premiers Vincent Siew and Georgievski signed
agreements on the avoidance of double taxation, investment guarantees
and customs co-operation.29 Still, the massive economic assistance –
amounting to over US$1 billion – was nowhere in sight.
By mid-1999, Taipei’s reluctance to shower its new ally with billions
of dollars became evident. The Taiwanese preferred – to use Premier
Siew’s wording – to teach Macedonians how to catch fish rather than to
give them fish (women bu song yu).30 This translated into small grants,
preference to provide loans and the encouragement of private invest-
ments. On his first and only visit to Macedonia in early August 1999,
Siew promised more loans and officiated the opening of the Skopje
Export Processing Zone (EPZ, jiagong chukou qu), where much antici-
pated Taiwanese investments were to materialize.31 In order to ensure the
supply of qualified workers for the zone, Taiwan funded a technician
training programme (Maqidun jishu renyuan lai Tai peixun jihua) for up
to 2,000 Macedonians.
Expansion of Foreign Policy Objectives
While officially denying allegations of “dollar diplomacy,” Taiwanese
diplomats attempted to highlight the value of their new venture. Vice-
foreign minister Lee praised Macedonia’s infrastructure facilities, quality
manpower, as well as natural and tourist resources, while his boss left no
doubt that the Macedonian breakthrough increased Taipei’s international
visibility and “bargaining power in international relations.”32 Lee went on
to stress the government’s determination to make relations with Macedo-
nia an example of how the ROC’s co-operation with Europe could be
beneficial. In the longer term, he envisaged relations with Macedonia
becoming “a vehicle for cultivating friendly ties with other European
countries.”33 The Macedonian project suddenly became more encompass-
ing and no longer confined solely to maintaining political presence in
Macedonia. In other words, Macedonia was projected as the first step in
Taiwan’s reinvigorated campaign to conquer Europe (see Table 3).
As soon as Taiwan established diplomatic ties with Macedonia, the
Taiwanese press reported on several Balkan states also expressing an
29. Zhongyang ribao, 10 June 1999, Zhongguo shibao, 10 June 1999.
30. Zhongguo shibao, 5 August 1999.
31. The promised loans included US$61 million in low-interest loans and aid, and
additional US$10.5 million in response to Skopje’s demand for more aid to fuel Macedonian
battered economy. China News, 9 August 1999.
32. Zhongguo shibao, 3 February 1999; Central News Agency, 28 January 1999; Frank
Chang, “Foreign minister Hu emphasises diplomatic strides vital to survival,” The Free China
Journal, 5 February 1999.
33. Frank Chang, “Macedonian exchanges to increase,” The Free China Journal, 11
February 1999.
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Table 3: Objectives of the ROC’s Aid Diplomacy towards Macedonia
Time frame Primary objectives Expected by-products
Long range 1. Macedonia’s 1. Increased political and
accelerated economic economic stability in Macedonia
development 2. Commercial/trade opportuni-
2. Extension of political ties for both Taiwanese and
influence in the Balkan businesses
Balkans 3. Possible domino effect in
3. Winning new Balkan developing states
diplomatic allies in 4. Break out from China-
the Balkans imposed international isolation
Medium 1. Maintain diplomatic 1. Trade opportunities in Mace-
range presence in donia and the Balkans
Macedonia 2. Increased investment
2. Symbolize friendship opportunities for Taiwanese
and long-term businesses
commitment to pro-Taiwan 3. Increased support of the ROC
regimes in the international organisa-
tions
3. Maintain access to, 4. Internationalization of the
and influence over, “Taiwan problem”
Macedonia’s China
policy
Immediate 1. Establish diplomatic 1. Challenge diplomatic iso-
ties with Macedonia lation imposed on the ROC by
China
2. Sustain 2. Obtain support for Taiwan’s
Georgievski’s foreign policy in the Balkans
regime in power and international organizations
3. Humanitarian 3. Possible future good will of
emergency relief the Macedonian public.
interest in closer relations. The ROC mission in Skopje turned into a
co-ordination centre of the efforts to befriend the neighbouring states
(primarily Albania, Bulgaria and Romania) and the territories believed to
be soon independent: Montenegro and Kosovo. In mid-April, foreign
minister Hu mentioned “two to three” countries allegedly interested in
diplomatic ties with Taiwan.34
The conflict in Kosovo unexpectedly aided Taipei’s scheme to expand
its visibility and bargaining power in the region, as Taiwan could offer
financial assistance to the Balkan nations affected by the conflict. As
early as May 1999, Taiwan reportedly promised Montenegro a big sum
in exchange for diplomatic recognition once Montenegro declared inde-
pendence. The Montenegrin Foreign Ministry denied the reports as an
34. Zhongyang ribao, 13 April 1999.
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“ugly insinuation” and affirmed the “one China” policy.35 In early June,
Taipei donated, through Catholic and charitable organizations,
US$100,000 in cash to Albania to help the Balkan state to cope with its
refugee problems.36 Soon after, President Lee announced a US$300
million aid project, which promised assistance to Kosovo and neighbour-
ing countries.37 ROC foreign minister Hu claimed that the aid package
had no political motivations, but he did not deny that the aid’s ultimate
purpose was to increase the island’s international visibility and to make
a major diplomatic breakthrough in post-communist East Central Eu-
rope.38 Kosovo and Albania were singled out as Taiwan’s most immedi-
ate targets.
Premier Siew’s goal to visit Pristina failed ostensibly due to NATO’s
inability to guarantee his security. Yet he managed to hold talks with the
deputy prime minister and concurrently foreign minister Mehmet Hajrizi
of the Kosovar provisional government in Skopje. The premier offered
Kosovo US$5 million to establish a medium-sized commercial bank in
Kosovo (in a joint venture with the EBRD) and indicated a readiness to
help train Kosovar banking personnel. He also donated buses, refrigera-
tors, blankets, clothing and fertilizer to Kosovo.39 The premier of the
Kosovar provisional government, Hashim Thaci, expressed interest in
closer economic collaboration with Taiwan, but cautioned that political
relations should be further discussed.
The refugee crisis following the Kosovo war provided Taiwan with an
opportunity not only to solicit new friends but also to re-surface on the
international arena as a “responsible member of the international com-
munity” through the pursuit of “humanitarian diplomacy” (rendao wai-
jiao). The ROC medical relief mission chose the biggest refugee camp in
Macedonia (at Stenkovec) not only to provide aid to the largest possible
number of those in need, but also – if not above all – to gain the greatest
possible media exposure. Taipei repeatedly emphasized its generous
participation in its first ever direct humanitarian relief programme in
Europe and its efforts to promote regional peace, noting international
mass media reports on Taiwanese humanitarian contributions.40
The Taiwanese also utilized their humanitarian assistance to propagate
the statehood of Taiwan. Shortly after disembarking from the plane,
the Taiwanese mission unveiled a banner proclaiming “Love from Tai-
wan,” while the ROC funded and manned field hospital was marked by
the ROC flag, a unique feature as no other humanitarian mission dis-
played a national symbol. The Taiwanese daily Zhongguo shibao ques-
35. TV Crna Gora, Podgorica, 29 May 1999, in BBC: Monitoring International Reports:
Monitoring European, 29 May 1999.
36. China News, 7 June 1999; Zhongyang ribao, 9 June 1999.
37. Ziyou shibao, 8 June 1999.
38. Zhongguo shibao, 10 June 1999.
39. Zhongyang ribao, 6 August 1999; Taiwan News, 7 August 1999.
40. Zhongyang ribao, 28 April 1999, China News, 12 May 1999, Zhongyang ribao, 30 May
1999.
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tioned the humanitarian credentials of the mission, dubbing it a
“propaganda team” (wenxuan tuan).41
President Lee’s US$300 million offer was yet another attempt at
“humanitarian diplomacy,” geared towards catching world media head-
lines and developing co-operation with international organizations (such
as NATO) involved in the reconstruction of Kosovo. Foreign minister Hu
publicly stated that the figure of US$300 million was cooked up only to
attract the attention of world public opinion.42 The originally considered
sum of US$10 million was deemed as too unimpressive to achieve this
purpose. Taipei’s hope that US$300 million would not go unnoticed by
the international media proved justified. However, the belief that such a
large sum could not be easily turned down by the UN-affiliated organiza-
tions, even if China applied diplomatic pressure, proved premature.
Despite an initial interest expressed by a few non-governmental organiza-
tions and the EBRD, which appeared keen on helping Taiwan channel its
funds into the Balkans, Beijing’s pressure proved sufficient to deter
UN-affiliated organizations and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
from accepting the offer. Unable to participate officially in Kosovo
reconstruction, and by so doing resurface as a sovereign unit in the
international community, Taiwan limited its contribution to 30 Macedo-
nian produced buses.43 In the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in
Taiwan in September 1999, the US$300 million aid package was shelved
quietly for an indefinite period.
Seemingly unaware of the fast depreciating credibility of its promises,
the ROC diplomacy in the Balkans continued to invent large figures of
economic assistance for prospective allies. In August 1999, Premier Siew
met “certain Albanians friendly to the ROC,” whom he allegedly
promised – although publicly denied doing so – US$800 million for
diplomatic recognition. Three months later, the ROC envoy to Macedo-
nia, Peter P.C. Cheng, rounded up the figure to US$1 billion. Some 47
Albanian lawmakers supposedly favoured a resolution on establishing
diplomatic relations with the ROC and Taipei was asked to arrange their
visit to Taiwan in the near future.44 The Albanian premier himself
allegedly supported diplomatic ties with Taipei to be forged in a foresee-
able future.45 The Taiwanese foreign minister Chen Chien-jen confirmed
that the meeting took place, but claimed having no knowledge of the
content of the communication and cast doubts on the US$1 billion offer
as contradicting common sense.46 Unsurprisingly, Albanian Foreign Min-
istry spokesperson Sokol Gjoka, in an effort to appease Beijing, re-em-
phasized Tirana’s firm stand on the “one China” policy.
Having failed to utilize the Kosovo crisis, Taiwan’s goal to win over
41. Zhongguo shibao, 18 April 1999.
42. Zhongguo shibao, 8 June 1999.
43. Zhongyang ribao, 18 December 1999.
44. Koha Jone, 2 December 1999, in BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 6 December
1999.
45. Lianhe bao, 4 December 1999.
46. Zhongguo shibao, 4 December 1999.
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Albania (and other Balkan states) depended largely on the success of the
Macedonian project. By late 1999, however, the project appeared to be
anything but successful.
Crisis
Peter Cheng opened the ROC embassy in mid-April 1999. However,
President Gligorov – fulfilling his promise made in late January – refused
to accept his accreditation letters. Cheng acted, thus, in the capacity of a
minister (charge´ d’affaires). Reciprocally, his Macedonian counterpart
Vera Modanu, who opened the Macedonian embassy in Taipei in early
June 1999, also served with the rank of minister. Taiwanese–Macedonian
diplomatic relations did not reach an ambassadorial level. The ROC
MOFA hoped that following the presidential elections in October 1999,
the new president, preferably Tupurkovski, would upgrade the relation-
ship to the ambassadorial level. But due to disagreements in the ruling
coalition, Tupurkovski campaigned not only against Tito Petkovski of the
SDSM (who vowed to restore relations with the PRC), but also against
Boris Trajkovski from VMRO-DPMNE. Unlike Tupurkovski, who de-
fended the Taiwan deal, Trajkovski distanced himself from the contro-
versy surrounding the recognition of Taiwan, even though as a deputy
foreign minister he visited the ROC in early March 1999 and then
appeared moderately supportive of Taiwan. The Taiwan project did not
help Tupurkovski, who lost the first round of elections. In mid-Novem-
ber, Trajkovski emerged as the new President in a run-off ballot. De-
scribed as “very friendly” to Taiwan by vice-foreign minister Lee, it was
hoped he would support Macedonia’s ties with the ROC.47
Taiwanese optimism appeared premature. Trajkovski’s evasion of the
Taiwan issue and cautious pledge to improve relations with Beijing, the
emerging split in the ruling coalition and the Macedonian public’s
growing perception of the Taiwan project as a costly failure did not augur
well for the future of Taiwanese–Macedonian relations. Angering Premier
Georgievski and the DA coalition members, President Trajkovski contin-
ued the policy of his predecessor and refused to accept the credentials
from the ROC envoy until the economic benefits of Macedonia’s diplo-
matic relations with Taiwan became evident. Macedonia’s Foreign Minis-
try estimated that by mid-2000 the ROC direct financial assistance
amounted to a meagre US$6.4 million, while Taiwanese direct invest-
ments amounted to nil.48 Taiwanese–Macedonian trade remained at very
low levels, with Taipei consistently enjoying trade surplus (see Table 4).
Vice-premier Tupurkovski and foreign minister Dimitrov visited Taipei
47. Lianhe bao, 16 November 1999; China News, 15 November 1999.
48. Central News Agency, 26 May 2000, Zoran Kusovac, “Macedonia – surviving
ethnicity?” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2000. In 2000, the International Economic
Co-operation Development Fund channelled only 15% of its expenditure to aiding Europe
(including Macedonia), while 47% of its total expenditure was loaned to and invested in Latin
America. http://www.icdf.org.tw/web_pub/20020726105730InvLending.pdf, accessed on 23
May 2003.
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in January and March 2000 respectively in an apparent attempt to
accelerate the flow of Taiwanese investments and financial grants. The
Taiwanese challenged Macedonian statistics, claiming to have transferred
US$12 million directly to the Macedonian National Bank and invested
US$80 million through other channels.49 They also called for patience, as
the financial benefits of bilateral co-operation were slow to emerge
because of the bureaucratic red tape in Macedonia. After a long delay, a
formal agreement on establishing an EPZ was signed only in early May
2000, once the parliamentary amendments made to the Law on Free
Economic Zones eliminated legal obstacles to the construction of the
EPZ. Under the agreement, Macedonia undertook to build the infrastruc-
ture, while Taiwan allocated US$12 million of initial capital in support of
the Taiwanese companies willing to invest in the zone.
The Taiwanese had their own doubts regarding financing friendship
with Macedonia. The US$300 million aid offer to the Kosovars, in
particular, triggered a debate in Taiwan. Although all major parties
agreed in principle that Taiwan could provide some assistance, they
questioned the scale of the proposed aid and criticized the decision-mak-
ing process. The “pro-unification” New Party announced that Taiwan,
given its growing budget deficit, could not afford such grand humani-
tarian projects and demanded the President’s resignation, as Lee an-
nounced the aid without the necessary consultation with the Legislative
Yuan and the MOFA.50 Taiwan’s second major party, the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP, minjindang) criticized the aid package for being
too vague and questioned the general direction of “dollar diplomacy,”
suggesting that “instead of spending billions to build ties with in-
significant countries,” Taiwan should “put an aid to use where [it] can be
more influential.”51
Traditionally, the DPP did not oppose foreign aid as such, but criti-
cized aid diplomacy as a waste of Taiwan’s hard-earned currency re-
serves and a tool to stall the natural course of Taiwan independence. In
the DPP’s view, Taiwan’s best road to a diplomatic breakthrough was to
declare independence. Only then could foreign aid be freed from
bondage, enabling Taiwan to offer genuine help to those states which
needed it.52 Such sentiments were aired by the DPP officials as late as
March 2000. Vice-President elect Annette Lu¨ Hsiu-lien of the DPP called
for an end to the country’s pursuit of formal diplomatic ties based on
economic aid. In her view, “dollar diplomacy” created corruption, while
foreign relations should be “spiritual, as much as essential and prag-
matic.”53 Yet ROC new President Chen Shui-bian (formerly the DPP’s
49. Lianhe bao, 14 May 2000.
50. South China Morning Post, 11 June 1999.
51. Taiwan News, 17 June 1999.
52. Lee Wei-chin, “The ROC’s foreign aid policy,” in Jason C. Hu (ed.), Quiet Revolutions
on Taiwan, Republic of China (Taipei: Kwong Hwa Publishing Company, 1994), pp.
332–344.
53. MIC News Bulletin, 4 April 2000, in BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe &
Balkans, 6 April 2000.
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chairman) and his administration (including Vice-President Lu¨)
reaffirmed the commitment to sustain diplomatic ties with Macedonia
through economic assistance, irrespective of the DPP’s doubts regarding
aid diplomacy and President Trajkovski’s insulting non-recognition of the
ROC envoy’s ambassadorial letters. New foreign minister Tien Hung-
mao made his first overseas trip to Skopje in June 2000, during which he
not only confirmed the importance of relations with Macedonia, but also
brought new economic offers. “The Republic of China, as a developed
nation, has the responsibility of contributing to the international com-
munity by providing loans or technical assistance to other less fortunate
countries,” Tien announced in Skopje, where he signed new multimillion
dollar economic agreements.54 No mention was made, however, of any
new investments or financial grants.
Derecognition
From the onset of their diplomatic campaign, the Taiwanese were
aware of the controversy they stirred in Macedonia, intending to establish
within three to four years a dependency relationship with Macedonia so
that Skopje’s ruling party/coalition (regardless of its political creed)
would find it too costly to sever ties with the ROC.55 Unfortunately, this
master plan was denied the necessary time to come through. The mount-
ing disagreements between the VMRO-DPMNE and the DA led to the
collapse of the coalition. On 30 November 2000, the Liberal Party of
Macedonia (LP) – a critic of the Taiwan project – replaced the DA. The
restructured government was neither pro-Taiwan nor united on the merits
of the Taiwan projects, while the ROC assistance to Macedonia was yet
to produce tangible benefits. The newly appointed foreign minister,
Srgjan Kerim of the LP, hinted of Skopje’s wish to forge parallel official
relations with both Chinas, while the new chairman of the Macedonian
parliament, Stojan Andov, called for the re-establishment of diplomatic
ties with the PRC.56 The emergency visit by ROC vice-foreign minister
David Lee in mid-December 2000 reaffirmed bilateral ties, but failed to
disperse doubts regarding Skopje’s long-term commitment to diplomatic
relations with the ROC.
The doubts concerning Macedonia’s ties with Taiwan intensified when
the rebel National Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare),
fighting on behalf of Macedonia’s Albanian minority, took up arms in
February 2001. The ensuing fighting escalated in March and April and led
to the formation on 13 May 2001 of the government of national unity,
54. Taiwan News, 25 June 2000. Tien and his Macedonian counterpart Dimitrov signed
two agreements regulating a US$20 million credit line and establishing a US$10 million
economic development fund, designed to help finance Macedonia’s infrastructure construc-
tion projects. Zhongyang ribao, 23 June 2000.
55. China News, 29 January 1999.
56. Macedonian Information Agency, 1 December 2000, in BBC Monitoring Service:
Central Europe&Balkans, 4 December 2000; B. Markozanova, “Beijing establishes contact
with Skopje,” Vecer, 8 December 2000, in BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 11
December 2000.
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comprising VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM and seven smaller parties, with the
DA becoming the only parliamentary party not included. Thus, Taiwan’s
major ally remained outside the government, while its most vocal critic,
SDMS, was put in charge of foreign affairs. The Social Democrats’
well-known stand on the Taiwan project and wider geo-political consider-
ations, which required China’s support at the UN Security Council if
NATO or UN peacekeeping forces were to be involved in restoring peace
in Macedonia, sealed the fate of Taiwan’s diplomatic ties with Macedo-
nia. Taipei’s donation of US$1 million to help Macedonian refugees
displaced in the civil war failed to make a difference. On 25 May, foreign
minister Ilinka Mitreva in a televised interview called formal relations
with the ROC a mistake and announced a re-establishment of diplomatic
ties with China. Her announcement coincided with the visit to Beijing by
the director of the Macedonian presidential office Zoran Jolevski, who
discussed the prospects of the resumption of diplomatic relations with the
PRC’s Foreign Ministry. On 31 May, when foreign minister Tien trav-
elled to Skopje in a last-ditch effort to shore up bilateral ties, Mitreva
(who refused to meet Tien) officially confirmed the government’s resolve
to sever relations with the ROC. The government, however, seemed
disunited on the issue. Premier Georgievski vetoed Mitreva’s motion to
switch Skopje’s diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing on the
grounds that it was against administrative procedures. On 12 June, the
Macedonian government resolved to normalize relations with the PRC,
under the pressure of the SDMS-controlled Foreign Ministry. The stern
warning from Taiwan, issued a day later, threatening the termination of
all ROC-funded assistance projects in Macedonia (estimated at US$140
million, see Table 5) fell on deaf ears. On 18 June, foreign minister
Mitreva and her PRC counterpart Tang Jiaxuan signed in Beijing a joint
communique´ on the normalization of relations. Macedonians recognized
the government of the PRC as the sole legal government representing the
whole of China, including Taiwan. In return, Beijing pledged support for
Macedonia’s territorial integrity, “just demands” in handling ethnic
conflicts, as well as the expansion of economic ties.57
Shortly before Macedonia and the PRC resumed diplomatic relations,
Taipei broke off official ties with Skopje, terminated all agreements and
co-operation projects, and withdrew its technical mission (subsequently
transferred to Guatemala).58 The construction of the EPZ was halted, with
only a couple of half-built buildings in a field. The ROC mission,
however, remained in Skopje and three commercial pacts concerning tax,
tariffs and investment protection were kept intact. Foreign minister Tien
indicated Taiwan’s willingness to return to diplomatic ties with Macedo-
nia whenever the Balkan state decides.59 In the aftermath of the parlia-
mentarian elections, held in mid-2002 and won by the Social Democrats,
57. Xinhua, 18 June 2001; Reuters, 19 June 2001.
58. Central News Agency, 13 June 2001; Lianhe bao, 14 June 2001; Taiwan News, 18 June
2001.
59. Central News Agency, 18 July 2001.
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Macedonian re-examination of the China policy is unlikely to happen in
the coming four to five years.
Assessment
For a decade, Taipei attempted to capitalize on the systemic changes in
East Central Europe, but the goal of gaining new allies in the region
consistently eluded it. In the mistaken conviction of the Macedonian new
leadership that Taiwanese assistance could address the structural predica-
ment of the Macedonian economy, Taipei found a promising soil to
accomplish its goal. Resorting to economic diplomacy in the form of
bribes and inflated promises of foreign aid, the Taiwanese envoys per-
suaded the Macedonian new leadership of the economic advantages of
forging official ties with the ROC. In order to turn the Macedonian
project into a showcase of effective aid diplomacy in the Balkans, Taipei
made a concerted effort to assist the Macedonian economy through loans,
humanitarian and technical aid. The grand projects, such as President
Lee’s US$300 million package and the construction of the EPZ, were
meant to symbolize Taiwanese commitment to Macedonia in particular
and the whole Balkan region in general. Following China’s diplomatic
setback caused by the Chinese embassy bombing by NATO in May 1999,
Taipei’s aid diplomacy, designed for the reconstruction of the Balkans,
seemed timely enough to facilitate a resumption of Taiwan’s official
co-operation with the Balkan states and the intergovernmental organiza-
tions. Yet Taipei proved unable not only to replicate its Macedonian
success in other parts of the Balkan region, but even to maintain its
presence in Macedonia. Why did the Taiwanese aid diplomacy prove
ineffective?
When the Macedonian project failed following Skopje’s resumption of
diplomatic relations with China in June 2001, Taiwanese diplomats did
not attribute the failure to the poorly thought out and poorly implemented
foreign aid, but to the domestic instability in Macedonia and the salience
of the China factor.60 Although Beijing refrained from utilizing economic
tools of foreign policy to lure Skopje, its anti-Macedonian stand in the
UN Security Council became crucial when the civil war erupted in
Macedonia. The war accelerated the political change in Skopje, bringing
to power forces hostile to Taiwan and creating a situation where China’s
involvement in the resolution of Macedonian domestic problems seemed
necessary. Hence Skopje resolved to re-establish relations with the PRC
because of security, rather than economic, reasons. Foreign minister Tien
announced that the MOFA would review “relevant qualifications” of
prospective candidates for allies more carefully in the future, implying
that the socially stable ones would be preferred.61 However, to claim that
the Macedonian project failed because of domestic instability in Macedo-
nia is to suggest that Taiwan should be searching for diplomatic allies
60. Interview with an ROC diplomat, Moscow, September 2002.
61. Central News Agency, 19 June 2001.
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among states featuring social stability and economic prosperity. This is
rather unlikely given China’s clout in international politics and its rising
economic power. Frankly, Taiwan has little to offer in exchange for
diplomatic relations, except money. Thus, the candidates for Taiwan’s
diplomatic partners are by necessity small, impoverished and distressed.
Only there, the prospects of Taiwanese economic assistance might appear
alluring even when China’s counter-measures are taken into account.
Given the Macedonians’ disregard for the China veto in February 1999,
despite the concerns expressed by the Western powers, and doubts about
the Taiwan project long predating the civil war and resulting primarily
from the invisibility of Taiwanese foreign aid, the failure of the Macedo-
nian project was triggered as much by Taipei’s mismanagement of its aid
diplomacy as by the China factor and Macedonia’s domestic instability.
Shortly after losing Macedonia, ROC legislators from all opposition
parties requested an end to aid diplomacy, claiming that the focus of
diplomatic efforts should be placed on exchanges between nations, rather
than the number of allies.62 The increasing transparency of ROC diplo-
matic activities, the parliamentary scrutiny of foreign aid and public
opposition to funding friendship with insignificant states when Taiwan
faces economic crisis do not auger well for the continued employment of
foreign aid to expand Taiwan’s pool of diplomatic partners. Democracy
and aid transparency do not facilitate Taiwan’s economic diplomacy
which requires secrecy because of the China factor. There is no evidence
so far that Chen Jie’s prediction regarding the DPP government’s ability
to “develop its own skills in conducting secret diplomacy and resisting
public outcry against ‘money diplomacy’ ” has materialized.63 Although
Taipei maintains a token presence in Macedonia and its contacts with
Kosovo and Montenegro might one day facilitate political relations with
these two territories, once they become independent, the failure of the
Macedonian project heralds not only a setback in the ROC diplomatic
strategy vis-a`-vis the post-communist states, but also the bankruptcy of
aid diplomacy – based on promises rather than actual aid – as a viable
method to break away from the PRC-imposed international isolation.
62. Central News Agency, 18 June 2001.
63. Chen Jie, “The influences of democracy on Taiwan’s foreign policy,” Issues and
Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July/August 2000), pp. 31–32.
